Climate Governance is Failing Us: We All Need to Respond by Riedy, Chris & McGregor, Ian
 
PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011. 
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest 
edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor. 
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal 
PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate Governance is Failing Us: We All Need to Respond 
 
Chris Riedy and Ian M. McGregor, University of Technology, Sydney, Guest 
editors 
 
 
The primary international treaty that guides global climate governance is the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), agreed at the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992. The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994 and has been ratified 
by 195 countries, known as Parties to the UNFCCC. Since it came into force, there have 
been annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) each year, starting in 1995. The 
UNFCCC contains no binding emission reduction targets, so negotiations were 
launched in 1995 to strengthen commitments under the UNFCC. In 1997, at the Third 
Conference of the Parties (COP-3), the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which 
set binding emission reduction targets for industrialised countries. These targets applied 
to average annual emissions during what is known as the First Commitment Period, 
between 2008 and 2012. As the First Commitment Period under the KP ends in 2012, 
the Parties commenced negotiations on the details of a Second Commitment Period in 
2005, at COP-11 in Montreal. Then, in 2007, the Parties agreed to the Bali Action Plan 
at COP-13. Under the Bali Action Plan, Parties agreed that negotiations would 
commence on a parallel agreement on Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) under the 
UNFCCC. The aim of the Bali Action Plan was that negotiations under both the KP and 
LCA tracks would be completed so that an agreement could be signed at COP-15 in 
Copenhagen in late 2009 (UNFCCC 2011a). As a consequence of this history, and the 
growth of a vocal climate action movement around the world, COP-15 received 
unprecedented media, political and public attention. For the global climate action 
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movement, Copenhagen was supposed to deliver a fair, ambitious and binding 
international treaty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (CAN International 2009). 
 
However, in the wake of the global financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008–2009, 
the political will for negotiating such a treaty was far from universal. Despite attracting 
some 120 Heads of State, which Dimitrov (2010: 18) claims was ‘the highest 
concentration of robust decision-making power the world had seen,’ the outcome of 
Copenhagen was the Copenhagen Accord, which is not binding, and many have claimed 
is neither fair nor ambitious. Negotiated in the last hours of the conference by a small 
group of countries, including the USA, China, Brazil, India and South Africa, the 
Accord was noted, but not adopted, by COP-15. 
 
In the wake of COP-15, assessments of what had been achieved were mixed. While the 
conference had failed to deliver a binding international treaty, it did deliver an 
agreement that provided an opportunity for all countries to pledge emission reductions. 
Nevertheless, most in the global climate action movement were disappointed with the 
outcome. Oxfam captured the typical sentiment when it called the Accord ‘little more 
than agreement to keep talking’ (Oxfam 2009: 1). 
 
A year later, at COP-16 in Cancun, the Parties adopted the Cancun Agreements. These 
Agreements effectively formalised the Copenhagen Accord, establishing an objective of 
reducing human-generated greenhouse gas emissions over time to keep the global 
average temperature rise below two degrees above pre-industrial levels and to consider 
strengthening the goal to 1.5 degrees (UNFCCC 2011b). The Copenhagen Accord also 
provided a mechanism for all countries to pledge emission reductions. At least 89 
countries have now pledged to limit their emissions, accounting for more than 80% of 
global emissions (DCCEE 2011). 
 
However, as COP-17 approaches in Durban in December 2011,1 global climate change 
governance remains plagued by seemingly intractable disputes. First, many argue that 
current climate science supports even stronger limits on temperature rise than the two-
degree limit on temperature rise contemplated in the Cancun Agreements. For example, 
the Alliance of Small Island States advocates limiting temperature rise to no more than 
1.5 degrees (AOSIS 2009) and some climate scientists have called for a return of carbon 
                                                
1 This special issue went to press during the Durban meeting. 
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dioxide levels in the atmosphere to 350ppm (Hansen et al. 2008). Second, the emission 
reductions pledged by countries to date are not sufficient to meet even the objective 
listed in the Cancun Agreements of limiting temperature rise to no more than two 
degrees. Climate Action Tracker (Hohne et al. 2011) estimates they will lead to 
temperature rise of between 2.6 and 4 degrees. Third, the Copenhagen Accord and the 
Cancun Agreements are non-binding. If countries fail to achieve the emission reductions 
they have pledged, then temperature rises will be even higher than the range listed 
above. The past record of nations in meeting their emission reduction commitments 
does not inspire confidence in the emission reductions being achieved. Fourth, serious 
barriers exist to the establishment of a binding treaty, including ongoing disputes over 
the legal form of a treaty, its relationship to the Kyoto Protocol, financing mechanisms, 
and the fair share of emission reductions that different nations should take on. Most 
developing countries support a Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol 
alongside an agreement on Long-term Cooperative Action, while many developed 
countries are resisting an updated Kyoto Protocol. Fifth, the requirement for 
international consensus on decisions under the UNFCCC makes progress painfully slow 
and subject to veto by nations pursuing what they see as their national interest. Some 
have questioned whether an effective international response to climate change is even 
possible under such a system (Naim 2009). 
 
We should not be surprised that agreement on an effective global climate governance 
system is proving so difficult. As Mike Hulme (2009) points out, there are many 
reasons to disagree on climate change. It is a problem with some unprecedented 
characteristics that challenge governance systems like never before. It is a global 
commons problem, requiring simultaneous action by diverse governments, businesses 
and people on a scale that has never been achieved. It is a creeping problem; people 
perceive climate change as affecting other people in other places and times, rather than 
here and now, making it easy to postpone action or dismiss the problem entirely. It is 
the product of complex systems whose future behaviour cannot be predicted with 
complete certainty, making climate science an ideological battleground. It challenges 
the hegemonic economic system and its unsustainable reliance on infinite sources of 
material and infinite sinks. It requires complete transformation of the fossil fuel based 
energy system that has delivered a powerful section of humanity unprecedented material 
wealth.  
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New approaches to global governance, then, are needed to respond to the unprecedented 
challenge of climate change. It is with this need for fresh thinking in mind that we 
decided to put together this special issue on global climate change governance in the 
wake of Copenhagen.   
 
In this special issue, we have gathered six diverse articles that each look at the climate 
governance problem through a very different lens. One thing all the authors agree on is 
that the current system of climate governance is not delivering an effective response to 
climate change—the climate governance system is failing humanity and is in need of 
repair. However, the authors have very different prescriptions for reform of climate 
governance, ranging from minor reforms to radical overturning of the existing regime. 
 
Brian Fisher’s article assumes that the UNFCCC will remain a key site for global 
climate governance but argues for an important shift in the focus of the negotiations. He 
contends that the negotiations are hampered by the lack of a shared long-term vision and 
by the narrow focus on emission reduction targets and timetables. Seeking an alternative 
approach, Fisher looks closely at the wording of Article 2 of the UNFCCC, which sets 
an objective of avoiding dangerous interference with the climate system. Through this 
examination, he identifies five alternative approaches that could theoretically be 
employed to achieve the objectives of Article 2. Each approach focuses on a different 
element of what he calls the ‘climate process’: local anthropogenic drivers of emission 
(i.e. sources); global anthropogenic structural drivers; national greenhouse gas 
emissions (i.e. the current targets and timetables approach); the fairness of the process 
of international climate negotiations; and the outcomes of climate change.  
 
After considering the advantages and disadvantages of each of these five approaches, 
Fisher argues that the international negotiations should concentrate on agreed actions to 
eliminate emission sources and minimise negative outcomes of climate change. In 
practice, this would mean the abandonment of national emission reduction targets in 
favour of collaborative international development of clean energy technologies, 
alongside adaptation strategies to protect the most vulnerable. This kind of reform of the 
UNFCCC process offers one possible path beyond the current impasse of global climate 
governance. However, despite numerous proposals for institutional reform of climate 
governance in recent years, the pace of change is glacial. It remains to be seen whether 
the type of proposals that Fisher puts forward can gain some traction. Further, Fisher’s 
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proposals leave the UNFCCC intact as the key site of global climate governance, a 
position that sits awkwardly with some of the other articles in this special issue. 
 
One proposed alternative model of global climate governance is minilateralism, which 
Jeffrey McGee investigates in his contribution to the special issue. It is often observed 
that the UNFCCC consensus rules make any meaningful agreement between the 195 
Parties to the UNFCCC difficult. While discussions about reform of these rules continue, 
and the overruling of Bolivia’s express objection to the Cancun Agreements sets an 
interesting precedent for moving beyond simple consensus (Rajamani 2011), some 
argue that the multilateral UNFCCC should be abandoned altogether in favour of 
negotiations within smaller groups of nations. Proponents of minilateralism argue that 
convening a smaller group of key states, perhaps the 20 biggest emitters or the G20 
(which is essentially the same group), is a more promising route to overcoming barriers 
to an international agreement on climate change response. This is a utilitarian position, 
based on the observation that an agreement to reduce emissions between the 20 nations 
responsible for 80 percent of emissions would essentially solve the problem. 
 
McGee positions minilateralism as an emergent discourse in the field of climate 
governance. He assesses the key objections to minilateralism, most worrying of which is 
the exclusion of those most impacted by climate change from the negotiations under 
many minilateral models. He demonstrates that minilateralism is inconsistent with both 
cosmopolitan and deliberative theories of democracy and therefore does not advocate a 
solely minilateral approach to climate governance. However, McGee draws on John 
Dryzek’s work to argue that emergent discourses that gather power either replace 
existing discourses or are accommodated into them. He sees potential for some of the 
positive elements of a minilateral discourse to be incorporated into the UNFCCC, 
without compromising democracy. For example, the UNFCCC could form ‘a peak body 
of the twenty most responsible, vulnerable and capable states plus representatives of key 
NGO groups’ that would become an influential advisor to the process without having 
ultimate decision making power. 
 
Whether international climate negotiations are multilateral or minilateral, some key 
challenges remain unchanged. One of these is the continuing failure of the United States 
to commit to strong domestic action on climate change and the critical role this plays in 
undermining trust in the international negotiations. As the largest historical emitter of 
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greenhouse gases, the second largest current emitter and one of the highest per capita 
emitters in the world, other nations look to the USA to show leadership in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. To date, that leadership has been sadly lacking.  
 
Bob Brinkmann and Sandra Garren provide a comprehensive examination of the recent 
development of climate change policy in the United States through the Congress, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the courts. As the only major developed 
nation not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the United States has long been a drag on 
international climate change response. Brinkmann and Garren argue that, while there 
were some hopeful developments under President Obama, the election of the 
Republican-dominated 112th Congress, with many members of Congress openly 
questioning the science of anthropogenic climate change, has dashed any hope for 
domestic legislation to respond to climate change. Brinkmann and Garren look at 
alternative responses, particularly the regulation of greenhouse gases by the EPA and 
the use of the court system to litigate for stronger greenhouse gas controls. It is the 
former that remains the greatest source of hope for greenhouse gas emission reduction 
in the United States. But it is only a small glimmer of hope in a political landscape that 
seems gridlocked on climate change and many other issues. The prospects of the United 
States playing a leadership role in the international response to climate change seem 
remote at this time. 
 
The remaining papers look at alternatives to the current system of State-based 
international negotiations through the UNFCCC. Chris Riedy and Jade Herriman 
investigate the potential to develop a system of global climate governance that is more 
consistent with principles of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy puts 
talking, rather than voting, at the heart of democracy. In the current system of global 
climate governance, where nation states negotiate on behalf of their constituencies with 
little direct citizen involvement, opportunities for citizens to deliberate on global 
responses to climate change and influence the negotiations are rare. In the months 
before COP-15, an ambitious project called World Wide Views on Global Warming 
(WWViews) sought to give citizens a voice in the international negotiations. On 26 
September 2009, WWViews brought together 4,000 citizens in 38 countries to 
deliberate on international climate policy and make recommendations to the negotiators 
meeting in Copenhagen. As two of the organisers of the Australian WWViews event, 
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Riedy and Herriman provide a reflective evaluation of WWViews. They examine the 
role that deliberative mini-publics, like WWViews, can play in facilitating the 
emergence of a global deliberative system for climate change response. Their evaluation 
is mixed; while the project was well managed, enjoyed by participants and 
demonstrated the feasibility of convening global mini-publics, it arguably achieved little 
influence on global climate change policy. This is a recurring problem for deliberative 
mini-publics at all scales. Riedy and Herriman argue that global mini-publics do have a 
role in democratizing the global climate governance system. But they need to: place 
greater priority on the quality of deliberation; provide flexibility to respond to diverse 
cultural and political contexts; maximize their potential for influence by running over 
longer time periods; and bring global citizens together in international processes rather 
than discrete national events.  
 
While organized deliberative democracy events may have a role in democratizing global 
climate governance, James Goodman argues for more radical forms of democracy. For 
Goodman, climate governance is a space that needs to be confronted, contested and 
disordered by global civil society. He argues that the official climate governance 
discourse reproduces hegemonic power relations and supports exploitation of the South 
by the North. He traces the emergence of unofficial discourses of climate justice that 
seek to disorder and contest the official discourse of climate governance. This non-
official climate justice discourse focuses attention on the devastating impacts of climate 
change on those in the South and on specific sites of climate policy failure. Sites of 
proposed power station and runway expansions, for example, highlight the contradiction 
between official climate policy and climate practice and have attracted particular forms 
of protest, such as climate camps.  
 
For Goodman, the prevailing climate responses, such as carbon trading and offsets, are 
maladaptive in that they serve to defend a regime that ultimately needs to undergo 
transformative change. These responses are part of the system that created the problem 
and will therefore fail. Central to Goodman’s argument is the idea of climate justice and 
the contention that the current climate governance regime is unjust and needs to be 
disrupted. The recent emergence of the Occupy movement, drawing attention to 
economic injustice and calling for economic transformation, seems to add further 
weight to Goodman’s argument.  
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Where most of the other contributors seek new orderings of the climate governance 
system, Jonathan Marshall calls for greater disorder, or at least greater attention to the 
disorder that already exists. Marshall frames climate change and the failure of 
Copenhagen as a psychosocial disorder, arguing that the disorder associated with 
climate change causes our certainties, alliances and social categories to break down. He 
compares the disorder, chaos and uncertainty of Copenhagen with the disorder, chaos 
and uncertainty of editing a collection of essays on depth psychology and climate 
change. He uses the metaphor of ‘thrum’—‘the fringe of warp threads left on a loom 
after the cloth has been cut off; … the odd bits of waste’—to make the point that 
disorder is not something to be defined away by order but an essential and normal part 
of existence. He looks at the temporary, fragile and disordered networks that form 
around climate change and asks that our social theories include this reality, rather than 
seeking to impose an impossible order.  
 
From this position, Marshall goes on to contest the idea that justice is a useful 
framework for approaching climate governance, as it requires the establishment of a 
particular order that relies on an ‘us and them’ mentality and will itself become 
disordered. This places him in direct opposition with Goodman’s call for a justice-based 
approach. Indeed, Marshall would probably question all of the attempts to establish new 
climate governance orders put forward by the other authors. Instead, Marshall asks us to 
listen to the disorder within climate change rather than discarding it, in the hope that this 
will help to render it symbolically conceivable. Ultimately, Marshall asks us to embrace 
disordered, fragmentary and fragile networks as our response to climate change: ‘Rather 
than demanding fairness and justice, perhaps we can ask all who are concerned to act 
now, to cut back emissions, to find new lives and morals which apply to them rather 
than are demanded of others.’ 
 
We are left, then, with six very different perspectives on global climate governance that 
sit together somewhat uncomfortably. Like the climate negotiations themselves, the 
differences seem irreconcilable. For us, the way forward is in Marshall’s call for all to 
act now in ways that they can. The Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom has 
argued that we need a polycentric approach to climate change, characterised by action 
across all scales and sectors (Ostrom 2010). When dealing with an unprecedented global 
commons problem like climate change, we cannot hope to guess which kind of 
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responses will end up being most effective. What is needed, in this era of uncertainty 
and urgency, is conscious experimentation with many different modes of governance, 
from global to local, to see which will bear fruit. 
 
The authors in this special issue present six ideas for new experiments in global 
governance that deserve to be tested in practice. While the focus in this special issue is 
on global governance, the most effective responses to climate change may emerge at 
local, regional or national scales. Nevertheless, we should continue to pursue effective 
global climate governance, just as we should pursue effective responses at all these 
other scales. We all need to act, within our spheres of influence, if we are to 
successfully tackle global climate change. 
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